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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The jury verdict and award in this case were based in part on provisions of the Utah 
Trade Secrets Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 et seq. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in denying WEST'S request for attorneys fees under the 
pertinent provision of the Utah Trade Secrets Act (Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-5). despite the 
jury's express finding that Defendant KeiL acting as an agent of Defendant Brody, 
misappropriated WEST's confidential pricing information? 
Standard of review: Correctness. Whether attorneys fees are recoverable in a 
given action is a question of law. which a reviewing court reviews for correctness. Also, 
whether the trial court's findings of fact in support [or denial] of an award of attorneys fees 
are sufficient is a question of law. reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 
305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
2. Did the trial court err in den\ ing WEST*s request for double damages under 
the pertinent provision of the Utah Trade Secrets Act (Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4(2)), despite 
the jury's express finding that Defendant Keif acting as an agent of Defendant Brody, 
misappropriated WEST's confidential pricing information? 
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Standard of review: Intermediate standard between "correctness" and "abuse 
of discretion." A finding of damages liability (or lack thereof) is a mixed question of law and 
fact requiring an application of law to findings of fact. "[A] trial court's or agency's 
application of the law to the facts may. depending on the issue, be reviewed by an appellate 
court with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review for 'correctness' 
and a broad 'abuse of discretion" standard." Drake v. Industrial Common of Utah. 939 P.2d 
177, 181 (Utah 1997). In the context of reviewing the propriety of an award of damages, a 
"rational basis" intermediate standard of review may be appropriate. See Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (in the context of a damage award, a lower 
court's findings of fact must provide a sufficient basis for the reviewing court to determine 
whether there is a rational legal basis as well as a sufficient factual basis for the award of 
damages). 
3. Did the lower court err in denying WEST'S request for damages, or the jury's 
consideration of the same, stemming from interference with WEST'S contractual relationship 
with Utah State University? 
Standard of review: Intermediate standard between "correctness" and "abuse 
of discretion." A finding of damages liabilit\ (or lack thereof) is a mixed question of law and 
fact requiring an application of law to findings of fact. "[A] trial court's or agency's 
application of the law to the facts may. depending on the issue, be reviewed by an appellate 
court with varying degrees of strictness, falling anywhere between a review for 'correctness' 
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and a broad abuse of discretion standard/' Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 
177, 181 (Utah 1997). In the context of reviewing the propriety of an award of damages, a 
''rational basis"' intermediate standard of review may be appropriate. See Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah App. 1989) (in the context of a damage award, a lower 
court's findings of fact must provide a sufficient basis for the reviewing court to determine 
whether there is a rational legal basis as well as a sufficient factual basis for the award of 
damages). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
WEST takes no exception to Brody's and Keifs "Statement of the Case," other than 
to note that this Court's written opinion in Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. 
Keil, 1999 UT 16. 974 P.2d 821. speaks for itself, and adequately sets forth the scope of and 
rationale behind this Court's ruling in the interlocutory appeal of the trial court's preliminary 
injunction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants Brody and Keil have apparently either misunderstood or ignored their duty 
as a matter of law and as appellants to marshal the evidence. ~[T]he appealing party has the 
burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict and then showing that it is 
insufficient/' Fitz v. Svnthes (USA). 1999 UT 103. «I 8, 990 P.2d 391. In their Brief, rather 
than meet their burden of marshaling the evidence, Brody and Keil instead have selectively 
presented as "facts" those portions of testimony that are most favorable to their argument on 
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appeal while at the same time omitting critical evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Thus, 
they have failed in their duty to marshal (as is discussed further below). As a consequence, 
WEST has identified below certain critical facts (with citations to the Record) which support 
the jury's verdict. While not exhaustive as to Brody's and Keifs appeal (since WEST does 
not have the marshaling burden in that respect), the facts presented below were adduced at 
trial and lend support to the jury's verdict, but were otherwise ignored by Brody and Keil in 
their recitation of selective material facts. 
As to the cross-appeal, the marshaling requirement is a little different. In that respect 
the trial court ruled as a matter of law that there was insufficient testimony to support 
WEST's claim for double damages and attorneys fees. Therefore, also listed below are facts 
that support WEST's claims on its cross appeal. 
1. Although Brody had some limited water treatment chemicals available prior 
to Januan of 1998, as of the end of 1997 it did not have any significant presence in the Utah 
water treatment market and was not a competitor of WEST. (R. at 2365, pp. 124, 138.) 
2. Beginning sometime in late September or early October of 1997 and continuing 
until he voluntarily left his full time employment with WEST on March 2, 1998, Keil worked 
at least weekly at Brody's offices to dexelop and price new Brody water treatment products 
to compete with corresponding WEST products. (R. at 2365, pp. 140-42.) 
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3. The water treatment products which Brody did have prior to January of 1998 
were inferior to WEST'S corresponding products and were unacceptable to Keil as the kind 
of products which could compete against WEST. (R. at 2365, pp. 139-40.) 
4. In October of 1997, Keil was introduced by Brody to one of Brody's chemical 
suppliers. Buckman Laboratories, as an employee of Brody. (R. at 2366, p. 257; Plaintiffs 
Exhibit Nos. 31.32 and 33.) 
5. When Keil was developing his products on behalf of Brody. and to ensure that 
such products were essentially the same as corresponding WEST products, Keil provided 
Brody with a list of suppliers WEST used so that Brody could acquire its ingredients from 
those same suppliers. (R. at 2365. pp. 143-44.) 
6. While still a full-time employee with WEST, Keil visited a company called 
Gardenburger on behalf of Brody, whose contact person, Jan Smith, he had called on a year 
earlier at the same place on behalf of WEST. He made at least two service visits to 
Gardenburger to check on and gather information concerning its water treatment system, all 
on behalf of Brody but while still a full-time employee of WEST. (R. at 2365, pp. 57-59; 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 57.) 
7. WEST's pricing rates to individual customers were kept closely guarded and 
protected within WEST. (R. at 2365. pp. 6-8: Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 10.) 
8. Prior to leaving WEST's employ, Keil had access to all of WEST's product 
pricing for customers he was servicing as a representative of WEST, including specifically 
5 
Alliant TechSystems ("Alliant"), Utah State University ("USIT), MagCorp and Cargill Flour 
("CargilP). (R. at 2365, pp. 32-33; Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9.) 
9. Prior to leaving WEST'S employ, Keil prepared letters to his WEST customers 
announcing his departure from WEST and stating on behalf of Brody that he could supply 
those customers with Brody products which were "essentially the same" as corresponding 
WEST products but at roughly ten percent below WEST'S pricing. These letters were 
printed on Brody stationery and delivered to WEST customers on or about March 3, 1998, 
the day after KeiFs departure from WEST. The letters provided side-by-side pricing 
comparisons between WEST products that such customers had been purchasing up to that 
point and allegedly corresponding Brody water treatment products. (R. at 2366. pp. 330-31, 
368-69; Plaintiff s Exhibit Nos. 12, 13. 14, 15, 16. 17. and 18.) 
10. At the time of his departure from WEST. Keil had WEST pricing sheets in his 
possession, many of which he did not return until at least a month later, and others, including 
pricing sheets for Alliant. Cargill. and MagCorp that he never returned. (R. at 2365, p. 33; 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 9.) 
11. To the right of WEST's prices on a WEST pricing sheet for Alliant which Keil 
had. Keil wrote in figures that were the same as those later quoted to Alliant as being Brody's 
prices for "essentiall\ the same" products. This written information was a source for the 
pricing information found in Keifs letter to Alliant and hand delivered to Kathy Vigil of 
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Alliant on or about March 4, 1998. (R. at 2366. pp. 249-50; compare Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 
21 with Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 15.)1 
12. At the time of the trial, Keil could not identify WEST'S pricing for one of its 
most important products without looking at a WEST pricing sheet. (R. at 2366, p. 388.) 
13. Immediately upon receiving the March 3, 1998 Keil solicitation letter on behalf 
of Brody. at least three WEST customers who had a long-term relationship with WEST 
terminated that relationship, and two. Alliant and Cargill commenced immediately thereafter 
to purchase water treatment products from Brody. (R. at 2366, pp. 179, 198-99.) 
14. One WEST customer. MagCorp, announced to WEST in a letter dated March 
16, 1998 that because of Keifs actions, including the Keil solicitation letter, it would cease 
doing business with WEST. (R. at 2365. pp. 156-57; Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 20.) 
15. Kathy Vigil, on behalf of Alliant. said that if she could get a comparable water 
treatment product from another supplier at a cheaper price, she would purchase the 
competing cheaper product. (R. at 2366. pp. 197-98.215.) 
16. As a consequence of receiving Keifs solicitation letter, and earlier discussions 
with Keil before he left WEST, on or about March 3, 1998 (the day she received the Keil 
letter), Kathy Vigil took steps to cancel a new ly signed two-year purchase order with WEST 
1
 The Court will need to view the original of Exhibit 21 to ascertain and read the light 
handwriting to the right of WEST"s prices. Some of the writing appears to have been erased. 
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and to immediately buy product from Brody. (R. at 2366, pp. 198-99. 214, 218-20; 
Plaintiffs Exhibits Nos. 1 and 37.) 
17. Kathy Vigil had not even met Frank Leaver or Curtis Beck prior to informing 
Allianf s purchasing department to switch purchasing water treatment products from WEST 
to Brody. The personal visit from Leaver and Beck occurred approximately one week after 
that decision had been made and carried out. (R. at 2366, pp. 217-18.) 
18. Bruce Henderson, on behalf of CargilL said that pricing is always a factor in 
deciding whom to use among competing water treatment suppliers, but that the water 
treatment product would need to be the same in any event. (R. at 2366, pp. 179-81.) 
19. It is not normal business practice for a water treatment customer to release one 
supplier's pricing to that supplier's competitors. (R. at 2365, pp. 129-30; R. at 2366, pp. 183, 
268-69.) 
20. For a water treatment business to know the pricing of its competitor would be 
a real and material competitive advantage. As a result of Keil knowing WEST's customer-
specific pricing. Keil could make Brody's products immediately competitive. (R. at 2365, 
p. 131: R. at 2366. pp. 268-69, 369.) 
21. CargilL Alliant. and MagCorp had been faithful customers of WEST for more 
than two years prior to Keil's March 3. 1998 solicitation letter to them. (R. at 2365, pp. 42, 
44.45. 49: Plaintiffs Exhibit Nos. 22. 23 and 24.) 
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22. The loss in profits to WEST for the two-year period following Keifs departure 
was provided to the jury in Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 292. 
23. Even though Keil was supposed to monitor WEST'S customers* product supply 
and ensure a constant, uninterrupted supply of the same, and even though he was given a 
commission by WEST for products that were sold, for some unexplained reason. Alliant ran 
out of certain of its water treatment product just at the moment Keil was leaving WEST. (R. 
at 2366. p. 199.) 
24. Alliant (f.k.a. Hercules. Inc.) required that any party supplying water treatment 
products to Alliant demonstrate, by means of six current references in Northern Utah, that 
that party had been in the water treatment business and engaged in water treatment services 
similar to those required by Alliant for the previous three years. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 
7.) 
25. Kathy Vigil of Alliant did not require Brody to go through the same pre-
qualification requirements that had been required of WEST. Furthermore, she did not know 
anything about Brady's qualifications other than what Keil had said to her. (R. at 2366. pp. 
220-21.) 
26. By at least Februan 9. 1998. if not sooner, and while still employed with 
WEST on a full-time basis. Keil prepared a form virtually identical to WEST'S customer 
2This Exhibit was later redacted by the Court to remove some of WESTs claimed damages. 
R. at 1981. 
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report form for the benefit of Brody. which was then used by Keil on behalf of Brody. (R. 
at 2365, p. 58; compare Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 6 with Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 57.) 
27. Keil mailed a letter dated March 3. 1998 to Clint Hovey at USU in which Keil 
said he would provide the same water treatment products at a lower rate than WEST and in 
addition would double the frequency of service visits. (R. at 2365, pp. 51-52; Plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. 18.) 
28. As a direct result of Keifs letter to USU. and in order to maintain USU as an 
ongoing customer-which it had been for approximately ten years—WEST was required to 
double the amount of its service visits. (R. at 2365, pp. 52-53.) 
29. The loss to WEST as a direct result of its increased service visits was the sum 
of $500.00 a week for twenty-four months or in other words, $52,000.00. (R. at 2365, pp. 
53.61.)' 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Brody and Keil have failed to marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict 
and then demonstrate that, despite such marshaled evidence, the verdict is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Instead. the\ ha\e selectively presented and skewed evidence to 
support their argument on appeal, in effect rearguing the merits of their case before this 
Court. The trial court properh denied summary judgment on the issue of pricing 
Any reference to I'Sl' including the associated damages claimed and outlined in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 29. were stricken h\ the trial court prior to the submission of the case to the 
jury. R. at 1981. 2366. pp. 293-294. 
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information, since the evidentiary standards and burdens applicable to a Rule 65A 
extraordinary relief hearing (involving limited evidence) do not obtain to a jury trial setting 
(involving a broader hearing of the evidence). Brody's and Keifs arguments about the lack 
of a written non-compete clause are misplaced and irrelevant, since: (1) Utah law imposes 
a duty on an employee not to disclose or misappropriate the confidential information of his 
employer in order to compete with that employer; and (2) the relief requested in this case was 
based on a theory of misappropriation of trade secrets and not upon a duty not to compete. 
By basing damages on WESTs losses rather than on Brody's and Keifs benefits, the jury 
utilized the proper measure of damages since Utah law expressly uses such a measure of 
damages. The trial court erred in refusing: (1) admission of evidence in relation to Brody's 
and Keifs diversion of the USU account from WEST; (2) consideration of statutory double 
damages due to willful and malicious misappropriation; and (3) an award of statutory 
attorneys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BRODY AND KEIL HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF 
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE. 
In challenging a jury verdict and that verdict's associated factual findings, Brody and 
Keil must proceed in two steps, first, they must marshal all the evidence that supports the 
jury verdict. Second. the\ must then demonstrate that, despite the marshaled evidence, the 
verdict and associated findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight 
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of the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. See Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 
(Utah 1989); see also Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467,470 (Utah 
1989). 
Furthermore, Brody and Keil have a high standard to meet in marshaling the evidence. 
4Tn order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must 
present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings [or verdict] the appellant resists." 
Interiors Contracting. Inc. v. Smith. Halander & Smith Assocs.. 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (emphasis in original, quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 
1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). "Once appellants have established every pillar supporting 
their adversary's position, they then 'must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence* and show 
why those pillars fail to support the trial court's [or jury's] findings." Oneida/SLIC v. 
Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), 
quoting West Valley. 818 P.2d at 1314. An appellant fails to meet his burden of marshaling 
where he ignores evidence supportive of a jury's verdict and associated findings and instead 
selectively marshals only evidence supportive of his position, since to do so is tantamount 
to improperly rearguing the merits of his case before the appellate court. Interiors 
Contracting. 881 P.2d at 933; Oneida. 872 P.2d at 1053. Therefore, when an appellant fails 
to adequately marshal the evidence for a reviewing appellate court, that court should "refuse 
to consider the merits of challenges to the findings [or verdict] and accept the findings [or 
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verdict] as valid." Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
As is apparent from a comparison between WEST'S "Statement of Facts" section 
above and the selective "facts" adduced by Brody and Keil in their Appellants' Brief, a 
number of important pieces of evidence presented to the jury and supportive of the jury 
verdict were not even cited by Brody and Keil in their Appellants' Brief. Instead of 
presenting such supportive evidence and attempting to demonstrate its insufficiency- Brody 
and Keil instead presented this Court with the selective version of the facts that Brody and 
Keil think the jury should have accepted at the trial below.4 In other words, Brody and Keil 
selected facts favorable to their theory of the case, while wholly ignoring those facts 
supportive of the findings of the jury and trial court below. Rather than properly marshaling 
the evidence as required. Brody and Keil selectively presented facts favorable to their 
argument on appeal in a misplaced and inappropriate effort to reargue the merits of their case 
before this Court. Because Brody and Keil have failed in their basic threshold duty on appeal 
to properly marshal the evidence, the jury's verdict must stand. 
However. Brody and Keil not only fail to cite certain material facts supportive of the 
jury's verdict, they go a step further to actually misrepresent or skew the nature of certain 
facts adduced in their Brief. In analyzing Brody\s and Keil's arguments as contained in their 
4
 Brody's and KeiFs implication of jury ineptitude is of a piece with their 
inappropriate and continued disparagement throughout their Brief of the abilities, competencies and 
judgment of both the jury and the trial court. (See Appellants1 Brief at 20,24, 25, 28, 39,40 and 41.) 
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Brief, it should be noted that a number of their arguments are built on assumptions that they 
reached in their arguments before the trial court, but which the jury did not reach and which 
in fact are contradicted by testimony presented to the jury and supportive of the jury verdict. 
For example, Brody and Keil in their Fact No. 17 claimed that Keil took no 
documents with him that set forth pricing. That is specifically contradicted by the testimony 
of Mr. Keil himself admitting that a pricing document, specifically Exhibit No. 21, he 
returned after he terminated his employment with WEST, had his writing on it. (R. at 2366, 
pp. 249-50.) Not only does that admission prove he had WEST's pricing documents after 
he left WEST but also the handwriting on Exhibit No. 21 reflects the pricing which Brody 
proposed to Alliant in Keifs solicitation letter of March 3, 1998. (Compare with Plaintiffs 
Exhibit No. 15.) In addition, the testimony is quite clear that Keil had other pricing 
documentation which he took when he left WEST, much of which he did not return. Thus, 
much of the claims of Brody and Keil contained in their Fact No. 17 with regard to how that 
pricing came to be put in the solicitation letters is not only strongly countered by testimony 
presented to the jury, but is completely contradicted by Mr. Keifs own admissions at trial, 
including Keifs statement that based solel\ on memory he had no idea what a particular 
price was for a particular WEST product. 
The claim is made in Brod\ \s and Keifs Fact No. 21 that Keil did not disclose 
WEST's customer pricing to other WEST customers. Since Cargill, MagCorp and Alliant 
are in totally different lines of business (Cargill is in the flour business, MagCorp extracts 
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minerals, and Alliant makes rocket propellants and other similar products), they were not 
competitors with each other. The competitors in this case were WEST and Brody, not 
WEST'S various and disparate customers. There was a specific disclosure of WEST 
confidential and customer-specific pricing to WEST'S competitor, namely Brody. Therefore 
Brody's and Keifs factual claim is off-point and irrelevant to the real issue in this case: 
whether Keil misappropriated and improperly disclosed WEST'S proprietary and confidential 
information to WEST'S competitor. Brody. Any inference that no actionable disclosure took 
place by virtue of the fact that no disclosure was made among WEST'S non-competing 
customers is totally and completely incorrect. 
It is represented in Brody's and Keifs Fact No. 23 that neither Cargill nor Alliant 
stopped utilizing WEST or started utilizing Brody on the basis of price. Although there was 
some claim that price was not the determinative factor in those companies' respective 
purchasing decisions, nevertheless it was a significant factor for both Cargill and Alliant. and 
they admitted as much, particularly on the basis that everything else they were promised to 
receive from Brody-in terms of product formulation and support service—would be 
essentially the same as the\ had been receiving from WEST. 
In Brody's and Keifs Fact No. 25. the claim is made that the rudeness and 
inappropriate behavior of Frank Leaver and Curtis Beck toward Cathy Vigil caused Ms. Vigil 
to switch Alliant's water treatment business away from WEST to Brody. The true testimony 
is that she had already made the decision to switch water treatment suppliers a full week or 
15 
more before she even saw or otherwise came into contact with Mr. Leaver and Mr. Beck. 
She testified that when Keil came to see her the day after he formally left WEST was the 
very day she went to her company management to cancel Allianf s newly-placed two-year 
order with WEST and to immediately place an order with Brody. Whatever the 
circumstances of her meeting with Mr. Leaver and Mr. Beck a week or so later, such contact 
was not the factor which occasioned Allianf s switch from WEST to Brody. 
One other area where Keil and Brody misstate the evidence is in the text of their 
argument at page 36 of their Brief. They point out certain information as "set forth in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit F and G appended to Defendants' Memorandums supporting Motion for 
a New Trial." Those documents are not part of the trial transcript. They were never 
introduced at trial as exhibits. No attempt was ever made to introduce them at trial. They 
are not facts before this Court. This inappropriate citation is an attempt to indirectly 
introduce evidence for this Court's consideration which was not submitted at trial below. To 
do so by the bootstrap means of identifying unadmitted attachments to a post-judgment 
memorandum is disingenuous at best. This Court should completely ignore the calculations 
and figures contained in such unadmitted documents, and should likewise disregard Brody's 
and Keifs argument on that point. The onl\ evidence which was presented to the jury with 
regard to damages was that which came from Plaintiff (except for Keifs claim of damages 
on his counterclaim). 
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One last instance of misleading marshaling is Brody's and Keifs selective out-of-
context quotation of Brent Chettle's trial testimony in order to make it appear that WEST 
acknowledged that pricing was not a significant factor in the water treatment industry. 
(Appellants* Brief at 30.) Mr. Chettle's testimony was that, all other factors being equal 
pricing can be the determinative factor in closing a sale of water treatment products. (R. at 
2366; pp.267-69.) 
The above examples of failed, incomplete, skewed, or misleading marshaling are by 
no means exhaustive. But the number and magnitude of such examples demonstrate that 
such instances of failure on the part of Brod\ and Keil are neither incidental, inadvertent nor 
harmless. Rather, they are legion, they are material and they are systemic. In short, they 
call into serious question all of Brody's and Keifs factual representations, both what has 
been included (including whether any given factual representation is accurate or placed in 
proper context) and what has not been included. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED BRODY'S AND KEIL'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ON THE ISSUE OF PRICING 
INFORMATION. 
Brody and Keil assail both the trial court's denial of summary judgment on pricing 
issues and the jury's verdict of misappropriation of confidential pricing information by 
arguing that such outcomes do not accord w ith this Court's prior ruling in Water & Energy 
Systems Technology. Inc. v. KeiL 1999 UT 16, 974 P.2d 821. This Court will recall that that 
opinion held that the trial court's preliminary injunction should be reversed since WEST did 
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not satisfy Rule 65A evidentiary standards, namely, WEST had failed to adequately show 
copying of confidential chemical formulations of products where such formulations were 
claimed to be misappropriated. 
In relation to the issue of confidential product pricing. Brody and Keil try to equate 
pre-trial preliminary injunctive relief with the jury trial verdict at issue in this appeal arguing 
that somehow the same evidentiary standards and burden for one should apply equally to the 
other. They argue that the same standards and presumptions that apply to immediate 
injunctive relief somehow obtain at a jury trial seeking damages. 
Extraordinary relief-such as a preliminary injunction as was earlier requested in this 
case-has a different standard by which they are tested. Preliminary injunctions necessarily 
involve presenting limited amounts of testimony at the outset of a case. By no means is that 
testimony determinative of the case's ultimate outcome, particularly considering the 
abbreviated and extraordinary hearing and the fact that discovery has not even begun in most 
cases. Simply because this Court did not find evidence sufficiently persuasive to convince 
it that there had been cop\ ing of WEST's proprietary' and confidential information given the 
limited evidence presented at the injunctive relief hearing does not mean that the Plaintiff is 
restricted to the same evidence without more in order to convince a trier of fact in a trial 
setting. Thus, this Court's previous interlocutory ruling goes to issues involving standards 
for preliminary injunctions, and not to those determining the propriety of facts as found by 
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a jury. Indeed a preliminary injunction operates on many of the same principles as a motion 
for summary judgment but usually without the benefit of any discovery. 
In this specific instance, discovery yet commenced as of the time of the issuance of 
the preliminary injunction and many of the facts which the jury had before it had not been 
adduced as of the time the trial court granted the preliminary injunction. Possibly among the 
most important pieces of evidence were the various solicitation letters which Keil hand-
delivered on or about March 3. 1998 to certain WEST customers he was servicing while 
employed at WEST. The letters were composed at least several weeks before Keifs 
departure from WEST, and made the claim that Keil could supply those customers with 
Brody products "essentially the same" as corresponding WEST products but at a ten percent 
reduction in price from what WEST had been charging. Those letters on their face tell the 
customer that the Brody products which Keil is going to be selling will duplicate what the 
client most likely considered was a confidential and exclusive WEST product, and more 
importantly, that the pricing from WEST (which was known only to WEST and the specific 
customer) is now known to Brody as a basis for competition. That Brody had access to or 
possession of WEST'S confidential pricing and was using it to solicit WEST customers was 
not known to the trial court nor to this Court on interlocutory appeal at the time of that 
preliminary injunction action. Those letters and accompanying testimony supply some of 
the critical missing elements that this Court said were necessary to uphold the preliminary 
injunction. nameK. proof that Keil was copying or utilizing WEST'S confidential pricing. 
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In short, the presentation of evidence in an injunctive relief proceeding is governed 
by those standards and criteria laid out in Utah R. Civ. P. 65A. In a civil trial setting, 
particular causes of action are governed by the standards and burdens of proof as may be 
outlined in applicable statutory or case law. In this case, jury instructions stating applicable 
standards of proof were given and were based on the State's Model Jury Instructions, as well 
as on relevant Utah case law and the Utah Trade Secrets Act. It is of note that Brody and 
Keil failed at trial to complain of any particular jury instruction in this regard (or at least have 
failed to show that any such objections were preserved for the record), and would be unable 
to at this point, given that the jury instructions finally submitted by the trial court to the jury 
were reviewed and approved by Brodv and KeiK who therefore did not preserve any such 
conceivable objection they may now make to the same. See Utah R. Civ. P. 51 ("No party 
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto.") 
Instead. Brody and Keil ignore and try to circumvent this deficiency by arguing, without any 
cited or persuasive authority, that somehow the standards of a Rule 65A injunctive 
proceeding should continue to obtain for a civil jury trial. The argument speaks for itself, 
and any contentions by Brody and Keil that the presentation of evidence presented at the jury 
trial somehow fell short of the requirements of the injunctive relief hearing should be ignored 
and discarded as irrelevant and pointless. 
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III. THIS IS NOT A CASE ABOUT NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS. 
Throughout the trial and throughout the entirety of their Brief, Brody and Keil 
continually raise the contention that WEST is trying to prevent Keil from competing in his 
chosen field. Reference is made time and again to the fact that Keil did not sign a non-
competition agreement.5 However, this is not a case about Mr. Keil competing against 
WEST, which Mr. Keil was free to do6. It is at its heart a case about Mr. Keil taking 
confidential information from WEST in order to compete unfairly and improperly with 
WEST. 
While it is true that there is no written agreement between the parties, the lack of such 
a written document does not nullify the effects of controlling Utah case law, which imposes 
an equitable, implied contractual duty on the part of an employee to refrain from 
misappropriation and unfair competition. In Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan. 872 P.2d 487, 
496-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). cert, denied. 883 P.2d 1359, the Court of Appeals stated: 
A former employee may not use confidential information obtained during the 
course of his or her employment to compete after termination with his or her 
Interestingly enough. Brody sought and obtained an injunction against its former 
employee Jim Wilson enjoining him from using or disclosing Brody's formulae, pricing, and 
customer lists, even though Mr. Wilson never signed a non-competition agreement with Brody. 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 47; R. at 2365. pp. 144-46.) 
6
 For example. Keil testified under cross-examination that he had prepared quotes and 
bids for Weber State University and Salt Lake City Corporation while employed with Brody, a direct 
competitor with his former employer WEST. WEST made no claim in regard to those accounts, 
because Keil had no access to WEST confidential information in relation to those accounts, and 
therefore did not interfere with WEST's economic relations nor cause WEST any damage. (R. at 
2366, pp. 380-81.) 
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former employer. A written contract or formal employment contract is not 
required in order to create this duty. %it is settled . . . that the duty of an 
employee not to disclose confidential information is grounded on 'basic 
principles of equity' . . . and upon an implied contract, growing out of the 
nature of the employer-employee relation." 
(Citations omitted; emphasis added). 
Therefore, Brody's and KeiFs several references to the fact that the parties did not 
have a written non-competition agreement is irrelevant and pointless for two basic reasons. 
First, the cause of action was based on misappropriation of trade secrets, and not on a 
violation of a duty not to compete. And second, for purposes of well-established Utah law, 
a written agreement is not necessary for such a duty to arise in the first place. Such a duty 
is implied in law from an employment relationship and the associated presence of 
confidential proprietary information by virtue of and in the course of such a relationship. 
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
AND MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS WERE SATISFIED. 
The standard for establishing interference with economic relations was set out in Jury 
Instruction No. 22. This instruction required a finding of misappropriation of WEST's price 
quotes. (See Jury Instruction No. 13.) Although two separate causes of action are alleged 
and the jury verdict found for WEST on both, they are interrelated by reason of the 
misappropriation element common to both. 
Brody and Keil claim that no actionable disclosures took place because Keil disclosed 
WEST's confidential pricing information to no one other than WEST customers who were 
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already in possession of such information. Specifically, Brody and Keil deny that Keil 
disclosed any such confidential information to Brody. Brody's and Keil's definition of 
disclosure of confidential information is interesting. They want to classify a disclosure as 
requiring the identification to one customer of the pricing provided to another customer. 
That is not the type of disclosure at issue, and certainly is not the type of disclosure which 
gave rise to the actionable behavior in this case. 
The disclosure in this case was made by Keil to Brody, while Keil was in his capacity 
as a holder of WEST*s confidential and proprietary information, in order for Brody and Keil 
(as an employee of Brody) to use such information to their own advantage and benefit in 
competing against WEST. Brody and Keil ignore the fact that without Keifs disclosure of 
confidential information to Brody. there could not have been any communication, whether 
oral or in writing, to any of WEST" s customers by which those customers would be informed 
that Brody was able to directly compete with WEST as to both similarity of product and 
pricing. Without such disclosures. Brody and Keil would be limited to communicating to 
WEST customers Brody's own pricing only, which admittedly was not competitive with 
WEST's pricing (prior to Keifs disclosure of WEST'S product pricing to Brody). Without 
the ability to tell WEST customers, by means of a side-by-side comparison of Brody and 
WEST prices, that Brody could not onlv meet but could also beat WEST s prices, there 
would have been no basis for these customers to consider switching from WEST to Brody. 
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The only thing WEST'S three customers at issue had in common was that they all had 
boilers and cooling towers requiring water treatment service and products. They had no 
concern whatsoever with regard to pricing for such services and products relative to other 
customers of WEST because they did not compete against each other in their primary lines 
of business. What is of primary concern to such disparate companies is that they obtain the 
best price possible for water treatment services and products from either WEST or WEST'S 
competitors. 
It was clear from the letters which Keil, on behalf of Brody, distributed to certain 
WEST customers that he intended those customers to believe the price they were getting 
from WEST was ten percent too high. This is because Brody as a competitor to WEST 
claimed it could provide the same products at cheaper prices. Such a representation was 
important to such companies if they were to switch to Brody because they needed a product 
that worked, and needed to know that Brody would supply essentially the same products with 
the same properties as the WEST products they had utilized in the past and that had a proven 
track record. KeiL in each case, supplied such necessary assurances using confidential and 
proprietary information he had obtained from WEST during the course of his employment 
with WEST. Keil was wearing two contradictor}' hats while making such representations, 
and is entirely too quick to either ignore or forget the fact that he was wearing those hats 
simultaneous!} by claiming that he merely utilized information committed to memory while 
he was working at WEST. What he omits or ignores is that he communicated WEST'S 
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confidential and proprietary information to Brody prior to, simultaneous with, and 
subsequent to his departure from WEST. That information would not have been available 
to any other competitor of WEST since, as was established by testimony produced at trial 
such information was confidential. The information was created specifically for a given 
customer taking into account that customer's needs, quantities of product utilized and other 
facts and usage patterns unique to that customer. Testimony further established that such 
confidential customer-specific information is not generally known in the industry. (See, e.g., 
testimony of Mike Kimball a competitor of WEST and a former employee of Brody. R. at 
2365; pp.125, 129-30.) Moreover, the information that Keil disclosed to the WEST 
customers at issue was provided to them the very day of Keifs departure from WEST. If 
Keil had simply left WEST and had gone to those customers to ask if he could obtain and 
utilized their pricing information for WEST products in order to compete, it is doubtful he 
would have been able to get that release of information. (Note that MagCorp personnel 
thought Keifs conduct in this regard was highly unprofessional.) 
It is also important to note the deceptive change in the Brody's products at issue. 
Prior to Keifs arrival Brody's products had actual product names. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 
No. 34.) After Keifs arrival and reformulation of such products, those products' names were 
changed to mimic the WEST numbering system for product names (using a "B" or a CWC" 
followed by a three digit number). Only someone intimately familiar with the WEST 
product line would know, for example, that WEST's B-206 corresponds to Brody's B107. 
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As a final touch, Brody's inspection report, which was always left with the customer, 
immediately upon Keifs departure from WEST was made to look exactly like the WEST 
form. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4 and compare with Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 57.) 
Obviously, such mimicry was designed to make WEST customers believe that competing 
WEST and Brody products were fairly generic in and of themselves, and that any purchase 
decision was only an issue of pricing. The testimony was clear that if the Brody product in 
question had been a different product than the previously-used WEST product, such disparity 
in quality or nature of product would have been a significant factor in any purchasing 
decision. However if. as Keil represented to WEST customers, the products were essentially 
the same, then pricing became the significant factor. 
Brody and Keil repeatedly claim throughout their Brief that pricing was not the 
determinate factor in a given customer's purchasing decision and/or decision to enter into a 
long-term supply relationship with a particular supplier. What Brody and Keil fail to note, 
however, is that pricing was in fact a significant factor and. moreover, all other factors being 
equal, could be the only factor that would compel a customer to sever a long-term 
relationship with its current supplier and procure its supply from a new source. In other 
words. Keifs representation to WEST customers was that everything about Brody's water 
treatment products would be the same as the corresponding WEST products, except the price, 
which would be ten percent lower. Those customers had Keifs assurance that heretofore 
unknown Brody products would be essentially the same as known WEST products, which 
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they could assume would be the case because Keil had worked with and sold WEST products 
and now was doing the same with Brody products (having even created them himself).7 
One of the jury instructions in this case to which neither Keil nor Brody made any 
objection relates to agency. (See Jury Instruction Nos. 27 and 28.) The jury found that in his 
activities on behalf of Brody, Keil was acting as an agent for Brody. (See Special Verdict 
Answer No. 5.) As such, Keil. as a holder of WEST's confidential information, disclosed 
WEST'S confidential and proprietary information to Brody as an agent of Brody. 
Furthermore, this was not in the form of simply retaining the confidential information and 
not actively using it. Rather, such confidential information was openly and actively used to 
WEST's economic disadvantage. The testimony is-as even discussed by Brody and Keil in 
their Brief-that Keil had to provide product pricing which was ten percent below WEST's 
pricing in order to entice any given customer away from WEST. For Keil to tell Brody that 
its pricing had to be ten percent below WEST'S pricing, and then for Brody to approve 
pricing which clearly was uniformly ten percent below WEST's pricing (and as in fact 
approved by John Liddiard. the president of Brody). is to effectively admit that not only was 
7
 At this point, it is important to address one of the strictures on this case imposed by 
the trial court, namely that having ruled in Brody's and Keifs favor in regard to the misappropriation 
of chemical formulations, the court required WEST to put on its case without any reference to the 
knowledge and access that Keil had to WEST's proprietary product formulations as well as his 
specific role in creating new products for Brody based on his access to and knowledge of WEST's 
proprietan and confidential chemical formulations. Therefore, for example, when a WEST 
customer, who was successfully diverted to Brody by Keil. was asked about product formulations 
upon examination at trial, the trial court immediately struck any reference to product formulations, 
and would not allow the witness to proceed any further along such lines. (R. at 2366; pp. 187-88.) 
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Keil using WEST'S confidential customer-specific pricing actively on behalf of Brody but 
also that he had specifically disclosed that information to others at Brody, including John 
Liddiard. All Liddiard had to know was what Brody's proposed pricing was going to be to 
any given WEST customer, and then he would know WEST's confidential customer-specific 
pricing if by no other reason than working backwards.8 Also, the testimony of Greg 
Offerman stated that the product pricing issue was openly discussed amongst Wilson, 
Liddiard. Keil, and himself, and that Keil was handed old pricing for Brody products which 
he rejected because it was not low enough to be competitive with WEST's product pricing, 
thus requiring Brody to lower its pricing even further in order to get to the requisite ten 
percent discount from WEST's pricing. (R. at 2366, pp. 226-28.) To say that such activity 
does not constitute disclosure is to deny the plain meaning of disclosure. 
To accept Brody's and Keil's argument would be to suggest that any employee who 
took trade secrets to a new company which was a direct competitor of the employee's former 
company would not be misappropriating such secrets as long as he, himself, used those trade 
secrets in competing with his former employer without telling anyone at his new company 
about those trade secrets. That docs not comport with the letter or the spirit of the Utah 
Trade Secrets Act or other controlling Utah law. 
s
 Thus, for example, if Liddiard approved the price of $0.90 a pound for a particular 
product to a particular customer (and the testimony is unequivocal that Liddiard agreed to work with 
Keil in getting the prices to such a point. R. at 2365, pp. 139-141 ), then Liddiard, along with Keil, 
would know that WHST's pricing for that same customer was $1.00 a pound. 
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The various elements of interference with a business expectancy and the elements of 
the Utah Trade Secrets Act were thus satisfied by the evidence presented at trial. The jury 
evaluated and weighed the evidence presented to it, and decided the issues accordingly. 
There is no identifiable basis of reversible error. 
V. THE JURY AWARD UTILIZED THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES. 
In this case, it was alleged by WEST and established by the jury verdict that both 
Brody and Keil violated the Trade Secrets Act and interfered with WEST'S business 
expectancies. The measure of damages under either theory is based on amounts lost to 
WEST, not on amounts that may have been gained by Brody and/or Keil. It is immaterial 
to WEST'S damages (lost profits) what is the exact amount of product that Alliant or Cargill 
may or may not have bought from Brody. Indeed. Brody put on no testimony as to exactly 
how much product Alliant and Cargill purchased from Brody. However, there was specific 
testimony as to what these customers bought from WEST in the two years prior to Keifs 
departure and misappropriation of trade secrets. For purposes of projecting future profits and 
making damages calculations, a two-year earnings period is reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
More importantly, controlling legal authority in this jurisdiction expressly identifies 
a complainant's losses as the measure of damages in both trade secret misappropriation and 
economic interference causes of action. Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4(1) states in pertinent 
part: "Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust 
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enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual 
loss" (emphasis added). Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 
1982)~on which Utah Model Jury Instruction No. 19.1 and the derivative jury instruction in 
this case are based-identified as an element of a case for intentional interference with 
economic relations the requirement that a plaintiff prove defendant's intentional interference 
"caus[ed] injury to the plaintiff' (emphasis added), not that the defendant benefitted in any 
manner. 
Thus, it is plain that in Utah a complainant's loss is the primary criterion for 
determining misappropriation or interference damages, and a tortfeasor's unjust enrichment 
or gain is only a supplementary—not exclusive or primary--measure. This is because the 
complainant's loss does not always directly translate into the tortfeasor's gain. A party can 
interfere with and destroy another party's economic relationship, yet still fail to benefit from 
or appropriate that destroyed relationship to itself. For instance, in this case Brody and Keil 
dissuaded particular WEST customers from continuing to buy WEST products (therefore 
incurring significant loss to WEST), but ultimately failed to secure or retain those customers 
on Brody's account (thereby realizing little or no financial gain from such diversion). 
Yet Brody and Keil ignore the clear language and intent of governing Utah law, and 
argue that damages are measured soleh by a defendant's gain. As authority for their 
misplaced argument. Brod\ and Keil cite to decades-old case law from federal circuits 
outside Utah which are obvioush not dealing with the subsequently-issued Utah case and 
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statutory law governing this case.9 It is clear that in Utah, damages from trade-secret 
misappropriation and intentional interference with economic relations are determined first 
and foremost on the basis of a complainant's loss. Brody's and Keifs contention that ~[t]he 
focus, therefore, should be on the benefit to the Defendants not what WEST purportedly lost" 
is a complete misstatement of law at total variance with the appropriate measure of loss 
specified by controlling Utah legal authority. 
Similarly. Brody's and Keifs conclusory statement that there is no evidence tying 
Keifs misappropriation of confidential pricing information to WEST's damages in the form 
of lost sales is wrong. The jury in this case, after consideration of the evidence presented and 
after due deliberation, found that the elements of ^misappropriation" had been met in this 
case, and that Keifs and Brody's improper actions caused WEST'S loss. Indeed. Mr. 
Rydalch of MagCorp. in characterizing the letter from Keil unprofessional and in citing to 
Keil in his cancellation of business letter (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 20) as part of the cause of 
9
 This exact same issue was briefed by the parties in Appellants" post-trial motions 
below, and the exact same Utah authority was adduced by WEST as has been adduced above. As 
such, Brody and Keil were apprised of relevant Utah authority on the issue of measure of damages 
in trade secrets and economic interference cases, and consequently had a duty to recite the same to 
this Court. See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.3(a)(3) f4[a] lawyer shall not knowingly 
. . . [f]ail to disclose to the tribunal legal authoritv in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer 
to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsef). 
Therefore, for Brody and Keil to affirmativeh represent to this Court that Cwthere is not a specific 
reference to the measure of damages in a Trade Secrets case in this jurisdiction," while ignoring the 
specific language of the Utah Trade Secrets Act itself, and of which they are fully aware, all in 
furtherance of an argument that decades-old case law from far-flung jurisdictions should control this 
issue rather than on-point Utah statutory law, borders on misrepresentation, and is just the type of 
misrepresentation that Rule 3.3(a)(3) above proscribes. 
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cancellation, made it clear that KeiPs letter was the triggering factor causing MagCorp to 
cease dealing with WEST as well as with Keil. In short, it was the loss or injury to WEST 
which is to be measured for purposes of determining compensable damages, not any gain to 
Brody or Keil. 
VI. KEIL'S AND BRODY'S MISUSE OF WEST'S TRADE SECRETS WAS 
MALICIOUS AND WILLFUL, AND ENTITLES WEST TO DOUBLE 
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiff s case in chief, the trial court rejected any claim based 
on a suggestion of willful and malicious conduct by Keil and/or Brody. (R. at 2366. p. 293.) 
At the conclusion of the entire case the trial court refused to grant Plaintiffs requested Jury 
Instruction No. 30.10 R. at 1957. 1971. As result, neither double damages nor attorneys fees 
were awarded. However, it is WEST's position that the same should have been granted. 
It is clear from trial court testimony that for approximately six months prior to leaving 
WEST'S employ. Keil actively worked to establish Brody as a feasible competitor to WEST 
where it had not been one before. He completely revamped and reformulated Brody's 
previously uncompetitive water treatment products. He changed Brody's product names to 
a numbering system deceptively similar to that of WEST's corresponding products. He 
created a customer form identical to WEST\s. He actively worked at Brody's offices at least 
weekly to create new products that would have essentially the same chemical formulations 
10
 The transcript of this ruling and related colloquy is the subject of and is attached to 
a pending motion. (See Motion for Admission of Additional Transcript and accompanying 
Memorandum, filed January 22. 2001.) 
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as corresponding WEST products. He knew that regardless of whether WEST customers 
knew the formulations as to the essential similarity between Brody and WEST products due 
to his long-time representation of and employment by WEST. That was an important 
assurance that WEST customers had to have before they would change long-term suppliers. 
Contrary to normal industry practice. Keil used WEST'S exact customer-specific pricing to 
tell the customer that Brody could beat WEST's pricing by ten percent. Thus, for at least six 
months while drawing a salary in addition to commissions from WEST, Keil was actively 
working to undermine WEST in the marketplace, not in the normal competitive spirit of 
competitive business enterprises providing competitive goods and services, but in a flagrant 
breach of his fiduciary duty to his current employer, and in full and complete violation of the 
confidentiality of proprietary information with which he had been entrusted by WEST. This 
conduct is egregious at best, and is fraudulent and corrupt at worst. This is not a case of an 
employee unwittingly using confidential information, or rightfully using general information 
committed to memory over the course of time. Instead, this is a case of an employee 
carefully and intentionally plotting for nearly six months to misappropriate and misuse his 
then-current employer's confidential and proprietary information to that employer's 
immediate and long-term detriment. In short, this is the very type of malicious and willful 
misuse of trade secrets that the double damages provision of the Utah Trade Secrets Act was 
enacted to address. As a consequence the trial court incorrectly refused WEST's claim for 
double damages and attorney's fees. This Court should correct that error. 
VII. WEST IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL DAMAGES FOR BRODY'S AND 
KEIL'S INTERFERENCE WITH WEST'S USU ACCOUNT. 
The testimony is unequivocal that Clint Hovey of USU received one of the standard 
Keil solicitation letters sent out to WEST customers (Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 18) in which 
Keil not only made his side-by-side comparison of product pricing, but also represented that 
he would now provide twice-weekly support service. In this instance, Keil was using the 
same confidential information that was the basis for the trade secret violation and 
interference with business relations found by the jury in the instances of Cargill, Alliant and 
MagCorp. Except for the trial courf s removal from the jury's consideration of any claims 
with regard to USU (R. at 1980), it is certain that the jury would have awarded an additional 
$52,000 to WEST for interference with WEST's economic relations with USU.11 The 
interference tactics in this instance were the same as those in the instances the jury was 
allowed to consider. The misappropriation and misuse of trade secrets was the same. The 
different element in the case of USU was the added financial burden to WEST of having to 
double its visits to USU at no extra compensation. It was improper of the trial court to have 
taken away that claim. The testimon\ was sufficiently clear and the special verdict of the 
jury is sufficiently clear that despite whate\er rebuttal testimony Brody and Keil would have 
proposed, the jury undoubtedh would have and should have made that extra award. This 
Court should therefore add S52.000.00 to the judgment. 
11




Brody and Keil fail in their burden of marshaling the evidence. Rather than gather all 
evidence supportive of the jury verdict, and then demonstrating how such evidence fails to 
reasonably uphold such a verdict and its associated findings, Brody and Keil selectively 
recite or skew facts in support of their arguments, all in an improper effort to reargue the 
merits of their case before this Court. The facts and evidence adduced in this Appellee Brief 
and at the trial below, adequately support the jury's verdict, findings, and award below7. For 
this reason, Brody's and Keifs appeal should be denied. Furthermore, the evidence adduced 
in this case is sufficient to support an award of double damages and attorneys fees under the 
Utah Trade Secrets Act, and the trial court erred in refusing to allow appropriate jury 
instructions to that effect go to the jury. Also, the evidence adduced in this case is sufficient 
to show7 damages accruing to WEST from Brody's and Keifs attempted diversion of the 
USU account from WEST, and the trial court likewise erred in refusing to allow the jury to 
consider this issue. The case should therefore be remanded to add these amounts to the jury 
award. In all other respects, the jury award should be affirmed. 
Respectfullv submitted. 
DATED thisJ^J? day of January. 2001. 
KESLER & RUST 
seph (/ Rust 
ttorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE/ CROSS-APPELLANT BRIEF, this ^ i h < / 
day of January. 2001. to: 
FEDERAL EXPRESS 





Thomas R. Blonquist 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
John T. Caine 




UUMMEKCE AND TRADE 13-23-7 
(b) Each health spa registering in this state shall 
designate a registered agent for receiving service of pro-
cess. The registered agent shall be reasonably available 
from 8 a.m. until 5 p.m. during normal working days. 
(c) The division shall charge and collect a fee for 
registration under guidelines provided in Section 63-38-
3.2. 
(2) (a) Each health spa shall obtain and maintain: 
(i) a performance bond issued by a surety autho-
rized to transact surety business in this state; 
(u) an irrevocable letter of credit issued by a finan-
cial institution authorized to do business in this state; 
or 
Oh) a certificate of deposit. 
(b) The bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit 
shall be payable to the division for the benefit of any 
consumer who incurs damages as the result of. 
(i) the health spa's violation of this chapter; or 
(ii) as the result of the health spa's going out of 
business or relocating and failing to offer an alternate 
location within ten miles. 
(c) The division may recover from the bond, letter of 
credit, or certificate of deposit the costs of collecting and 
distributing funds under this section, up to 109c of the face 
value of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit 
but only if the consumers have fully recovered their 
damages first. The total liability of the issuer of the bond, 
letter of credit, or certificate of deposit may not exceed the 
amount of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of 
deposit The health spa shall maintain a bond, letter of 
credit, or certificate of deposit in force for one year after it 
notifies the division m writing that it has ceased all 
activities regulated by this chapter. 
(d) A health spa providing services at more than one 
location shall comply with the requirements of Subsection 
(2)(a) for each separate location. 
(e) The division may impose a fine against a health spa 
that fails to comply with the requirements of Subsection 
(2)(a) of up to 3100 per day that the health spa remains 
out of compliance. All penalties received shall be depos-
ited into the Consumer Protection Education and Train-
ing Fund created in Section 13-2-8. 
(3) The minimum principal amount of the bond, letter of 
credit, or certificate of credit required under Subsection (2) 
shall be based on the number of unexpired contracts for health 
spa services to which the health spa is a party, in accordance 
with the following schedule. 
Principal Amount of 
Bond, Letter of Credit. 





Number of Contracts 
with an Unexpired Term 
Exceeding 90 Days 
500 or fewer 
501 to 1,500 
1,501 to 3,000 
3,001 or more 
(4) Each health spa shall obtain the bond, letter of credit, or 
certificate of deposit and furnish a certified copy of the bond, 
letter of credit, or certificate of deposit to the division prior to 
selling, offering or attempting to sell, soliciting the sale of, or 
becoming a party to any contract to provide health spa 
services. A health spa is considered to be in compliance with 
this section only if the proof provided to the division shows 
that the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of credit is current. 
(5) Each health spa shall maintain accurate records of the 
bond, letter of credit, or certificate of credit and of any 
payments made, due, or to become due to the issuer and shall 
open the records to inspection by the division at any time 
during normal business hours. 
(6) If a health spa changes ownership, ceases operation, 
discontinues facilities, or relocates and fails to offer an alter-
nate location within ten miles within 30 days after its closing, 
the health spa is subject to the requirements of this section as 
if it were a new health spa coming into being at the time the 
health spa changed ownership. The former owner may not 
release, cancel, or terminate the owners liability under any 
bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit previously filed 
with the division, unless: 
(a) the new owner has filed a new bond, letter of credit, 
or certificate of deposit for the benefit of consumers 
covered under the previous owner's bond, letter of credit, 
or certificate of deposit; or 
(b) the former owner has refunded all unearned pay-
ments to consumers. 
(7) If a health spa ceases operation or relocates and fails to 
offer an alternative location within ten miles, the health spa 
shall provide the division with 45 days prior notice. 1995 
13-23-6. Exemptions from bond, letter of credit, or 
certificate of deposit requirement. 
A health spa which offers no paid-in-full membership, but 
only memberships paid for by installment contracts is exempt 
from the application of Section 13-23-5 if: 
(1) each contract contains the following clause: "If this 
health spa ceases operation and fails to offer an alternate 
location withm ten miles, no further payments under this 
contract shall be due to anyone, including any purchaser 
of any note associated with or contained in this contract."; 
(2) all payments due under each contract, including 
down payments, enrollment fees, membership fees, or any 
other payments to the health spa, are in equal monthly 
installments spread over the entire term of the contract; 
and 
(3) the term of each contract is clearly stated and is not 
capable of being extended. 1995 
13-23-7. Enforcement — Costs and attorney's fees — 
Penalties. 
(1) The division may, on behalf of any consumer or on its 
own behalf, file an action for injunctive relief, damages, or 
both to enforce this chapter. In addition to any relief granted, 
the division is entitled to an award for reasonable attorney's 
fees, court costs, and reasonable investigative expenses. 
(2) (a) A person who willfully violates any provision of this 
chapter, either by failing to comply with any requirement 
or by doing any act prohibited in this chapter, is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor. Each day the violation is commit-
ted or permitted to continue constitutes a separate pun-
ishable offense. 
(b) In the case of a second offense, the person is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) In the case of three or more offenses, the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 1995 
CHAPTER 24 
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 
Section 
13-24-1. Short title. 
13-24-2. Definitions. 
13-24-3. Injunctive relief. 
13-24-4. Damages. 
13-24-5. Attorneys' fees. 
13-24-6. Preservation of secrecy. 
13-24-7. Statute of limitations. 
13-24-8. Effect on other law. 
13-24-9. Uniformity of application and construction. 
490 
13-24-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Trade Secrets Act" 
1989 
13-24-2. Definitions. 
As used m this chapter, unless the context requires other-
wise 
(1) "Improper means* includes theft, bribery, misrepre-
sentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to 
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other 
means 
(2) "Misappropriation" means 
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a 
person who knows or has reason to know that the 
trade secret was acquired by improper means, or 
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another 
without express or implied consent by a person who 
(I) used improper means to acquire knowledge 
of the trade secret, or 
(u) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or 
had reason to know that his knowledge of the 
trade secret was 
(A) derived from or through a person who 
had utilized improper means to acquire it, 
(B) acquired under circumstances giving 
nse to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit 
its use, or 
(C) derived from or through a person who 
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to 
maintain its secrecy or limit its use, or 
(m) before a material change of his position, 
knew or had reason to know that it v> as a trade 
secret and that knovv ledge of it had been ac-
quired by accident or mistake 
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, busi-
ness trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint 
venture, government, governmental subdivision or 
agency, or any other legal or commercial entity 
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a for-
mula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, 
technique, or process, that 
(a) derives independent economic \ alue, actual or 
potential, from not being generally knov. n to, and not 
being readily ascertainable b\ proper means b\, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrec> 
1989 
3-24-3. Injunctive relief. 
(1) Actual or threatened misappropriation ma> be enjoined 
Ipon application to the court, an injunction shall be termi-
ated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the 
yunction may be continued for an additional reasonable 
enod of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage 
lat otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation 
(2) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condi-
on future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty for no 
nger than the period of time for which use could have been 
•ohibited Exceptional circumstances include, but are not 
nited to, a material and prejudicial change of position pnor 
acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation 
at renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable 
(3) In appropriate circumstances affirmativ e acts to protect 
rade secret ma> be compelled b> court order 1989 
-24-4. Damages. 
1) Except to the extent that a matenal and prejudicial 
ange of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to 
know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery ineq-
uitable, a complainant is entitled to recover damages for 
misappropriation Damages can mclude both the actual loss 
caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused 
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in comput-
ing actual loss In lieu of damages measured by any other 
methods, the damages caused bv misappropriation may be 
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for 
a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade 
secret 
(2) If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the 
court may award exemplary damages in an amount not 
exceeding twice any award made under Subsection (1) 1989 
13-24-5. A t to rneys ' f ee s . 
If a claim of misappropriation is made m bad faith, a motion 
to terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or 
willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may 
award reasonable attorneys* fees to the prevailing party 1989 
13-24-6. P r e s e r v a t i o n of secrecy. 
In an action under this chapter, a court shall preserve the 
secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which 
may include granting protective orders in connection with 
discovery proceedings, holding ln-camera hearings, sealing 
the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in 
the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without 
pnor court approval 1989 
13-24-7. S t a t u t e of l imi ta t ions . 
An action for misappropriation shall be brought within 
three years after the misappropriation is discovered or, by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been discovered 
For the purposes of this section a continuing misappropria-
tion constitutes a single claim 1989 
13-24-8. Effect on o t h e r law. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this chapter dis-
places conflicting tort, restitutionaiy, and other law of this 
state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade 
secret 
(2) This chapter does not affect 
(a) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon 
misappropriation of a trade secret, 
(b) other civil remedies that are not based upon misap-
propriation of a trade secret, or 
(c) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon mis-
appropriation of a trade secret 1989 
13-24-9. Uni formi ty of applicat ion and cons t ruc t ion . 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject of the chapter among states enacting it 1989 
CHAPTER 25 
AUTOMATED DIALING TELEPHONE SOLICITATION 
[REPEALEDl 
13-25-1 to 13-25-5. Repealed . 1996 
CHAPTER 25a 




13-25a-103 Prohibited conduct for telephone solicitations 
— Exceptions 




WEST claims that Keil and Brody maliciously and wilfully misappropriated WEST'S trade 
secrets. If you find that the evidence in this case proves that Keil and Brody did maliciously 
and wilfully misapproriate WEST'S trade secrets, you may award exemplary damages 
against Keil and Brody and in favor of WEST in an amount not exceeding twice the amount 
the actual damages you find WEST has incurred by the misappropriation. 
An injury may be "malicious" injury if it was wrongful and without just cause or excessive, 
even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will. The word "willful" means 
"deliberate or intentional," and an injury is "wilfull" if it involves a deliberate and intentional 
act which necessarily leads to injury, or which the actor knew or should have know would 
result in injury. Therefore, "willful and malicious" injury is a wrongful act done 
intentionally, which necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-4(2); State v. Staver. 706 P.2d 611,613 (Utah 1985); Madsen v. State. 
583 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 1978); Black' Law Dictionary, p. 1434 "Willful and malicious injury" 




1825 South 6200 West 
It Lake Gey, Utah 84118-0747 
•KCZ: (801) 963-2436 FAX: (801) 963-2437 
March 3, 1993 
Mr. Cint Hovey 
Utah State University 
UMC66CO 
Logan, Utah 84322 
Dear dint, 
i have enjoyed our relationship dunngthe time i serw^d Utah State as a representative of 
W.E.S.T., Inc. I have mace a change, and I new represent Brcxiy Chemical. I have made 
this change for many reasons. A number of these are benendai to ycu. i can now 
provide you greater support resources arid a substantially lower cost for the technical 
service and the water treatment prcducs. Tne additional latitude and support I row enjoy 
wii! enhance the level of service I can provide ycu. 
This level will be particularly enhanced in the turnkey service en the cooling towers and 
the dosed systems. Because, under Brccy Chemical's TKP (TumKey Protecdon) 
Program, I will be performing ail the work, ycu wiii have a chemical engineer reguiariy on 
srte, rather than a technican wrth superficially imposed task and time constraints. Tnis will 
also prevent the communication problems we have occasionally experienced. 
The cooling towers require a greater frequency of service than the cjrrent program 
aiiows. I wiii double the current frequency of service en the thirty seasonal systems. I 
believe this wiii eliminate the problems we have seen in a few of these systems. Also, I 
will be able to improve the system service coverage curing system startup and shutdown. 
11 is wstsr trsatrnsnt prccucts tnsx i win supcry ars esssntisiiy u ie same as u icsa I have 
supplied in the past, and that have provided ycu with remarkable results. However, these 
products wiii new come with two significant advantages: first logistics wiii be improved 
because the manufacturing arc warehousing facifnes are in Salt Lake Gey, and, second, the 
cost wiii be substantially reduced because there will be lower product cost, and lower 
freignt cost. 
• ALT LAKc CITY. UTAH • LOS ANGclES. CALIFORNIA • DENVER. COLORADO • SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA • SOISF m i « n . 
• SAN FRANCTSCO r irrcnt jvr* - o u ^ -
The following is a list of the W.ES.T. products ( have utilized in treating your systems and 
the pricing, and the corresponding Brccy Chemicai products and pricing. The 
efectrveness and use rsies-will remain essentially the same, so you can see that the savings 
will be substantial. The freight S2vings will provide an additional cost reducnen of $0.08 
to $0.16 per pound. -The turnkey service for the coding towers and the dosed systems 
will cost 1696 less, even thougi the senAcs, will be greatiy expanded. In total, the cost 


























Please keeo this informsnen confidential. 
I have worked hard to optimize the water treatment program results and to improve 
process efficiencies. Tne resulting increases in process efficences and equipment life I have-
helped bring about have been quantified and documented. I am pleased that the resurts 
have paid ior my technical service and the treatment chemicals many times over. 
Over the twelve years I have served ycu, I have- developed an extensive knowledge of 
your systems and operations. I have aiso developed a. good working relationship with 
your personnel. As in the past, my objective wiil be to provide ycu superior protection 
for your systems by applying optimal treatment products, state of the art control and 
application methods, and competent and dedicated technical service, dint, I value your 
business highly, and I lock forward to serving yc<j in the future. 
Sincerely, 
BRODY 
PRIONG 
$1.05 
$1.80 
$0.80 
$1.10 
$400 
$28,500 
ANNUAL 
SAVINGS 
$400 
$3,800 
$100 
$300 
$2,200 
$5,300 
Steve Keil 
